CPLR 5513(a): Time to Appeal Begins to Run When Service of Judgment with Notice of Entry Is Made by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 44 
Number 1 Volume 44, July 1969, Number 1 Article 21 
December 2012 
CPLR 5513(a): Time to Appeal Begins to Run When Service of 
Judgment with Notice of Entry Is Made 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1969) "CPLR 5513(a): Time to Appeal Begins to Run When Service of Judgment 
with Notice of Entry Is Made," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 44 : No. 1 , Article 21. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss1/21 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ball Club, Inc., the supreme court, special term, entered an order di-
recting the defendant to pay ten percent of the monies held by it to
Avis and the balance to Sample. On appeal by Girard Trust Bank, the
Appellate Division, First Department, 100 held that a bonus paid to a
professional football player for maintaining a positive attitude for the
best interest of the team and professional football was to be con-
sidered wages earned for services rendered over the entire season, for
the purpose of determining what portion was subject to the 90 per-
cent exemption of earnings of the judgment debtor for personal ser-
vices rendered within 60 days prior to the delivery of execution to the
sheriff under CPLR 5205(e)(2). Determination of whether any por-
tion of an additional bonus for participating in 50 percent of the
offensive or defensive plays fell within the exemption depended upon
whether the last play occurred before or after the 60 day period.
Had the money been sought two months after the close of the
season, the judgment creditor could have avoided the 90 percent
exemption. However, the advantages apparent in acting so late are
offset by many disadvantages. A multitude of judgment creditors may
serve income executions at an earlier date or, if other judgment credi-
tors are planning a similar course of action, the sixty-first day may
herald a race to the sheriff's office. Additionally, there is always the
possibility that neither the judgment debtor nor his money could be
located at such a late date.
ARTICLE 55-APPEALS GENERALLY
CPLR 5513(a): Time to appeal begins to run when service of judg-
ment with notice of entry is made.
Appeals as of right have to be taken within thirty days following
service upon the appellant of a copy of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when the appellant has entered the judgment or order,
or served notice of its entry, his appeal must be taken within thirty
days after doing either. 101
In an Article 78 proceeding, special term, after rendering its de-
cision, directed that an order be settled. The respondents had sub-
mitted a proposed judgment, and the appellant had filed a proposed
counter judgment. The special term judge signed the appellant's pro-
posed counter judgment on May 29, 1968, and on June 13, 1968, at
100 31 App. Div. 2d 142, 295 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Ist Dep't 1968).
101 Previously, the time limit was 60 days. 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5513(a), supp. com-
mentary 297 (1967). See 7 WEINSrEIN, KoRN & MYu.TR, NEW YoRa CIVIL PRANricE 5513.03
(1968).
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respondent's request, it was filed in the county clerk's office. Appellant
was served with a copy of the judgment and notice of entry on July
17, 1968. Subsequently, appellant served a notice of appeal on the ap-
pellate division, which then granted respondent's motion to dismiss
the appeal since more than thirty days had elapsed since the judgment
had been entered. The Court of Appeals reversed, 10 2 holding that
where a proposed counter judgment submitted by an appellant re-
quires a party to request that it be entered, as opposed to being
automatically entered, and respondent makes the request, appellant's
time to appeal begins to run at the time service of judgment with
notice of entry is made upon him by the respondent and not when
entry of the order is submitted. 0 3
It is incumbent upon the practitioner to be familiar with local
practice; however, it is suggested that one should always serve his
opponent with notice of entry regardless of whose judgment was
entered.
ARTICLE 75-ARBITRATION
CPLR 7503(c): Ten day period within which a party may apply to stay
arbitration construed as statute of limitations by first department.
In Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills,'0  the peti-
tioner, upon being served with a demand for arbitration and within
the ten day period of limitation prescribed by CPLR 7503(c), procured
a signed order to show cause why the arbitration should not be stayed.
However," the order permitted service upon the respondent within a
period six days longer than the ten day limitation.
The first department, by a 8-2 decision, affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of petitioner's application for the stay on the grounds it was
"time-barred." Justice Eager's majority opinion recognized that a
special proceeding was necessary for the court to have jurisdiction over
an application for a stay of arbitration 105 and that a special proceeding
may be commenced by service of an order to show cause. 06 Further-
more, the court acknowledged that the order to show cause was signed
by a judge within the ten day period. However, the decisive fact in
the court's view was that the petitioner failed to serve respondent
within that period. The court held that "the mere signing of the
02 In re Stuart 8- Stuart, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 23 N.Y.2d 493, 245
N.E2d 225, 297 N.YS.2d 576 (1969).
103 Id. at 496, 245 N.2d at 226, 297 N.YS.2d at 578.
104 31 App. Div. 2d 208, 295 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1st Dep't 1969).
105 CPLR 7502(a): "A special proceeding shall be used to bring before a court the first
application arising out of an arbitrable controversy. ...
1O CPLR 804.
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